1.
First, however, let me explain why another way of challenging extreme axiarchism will not work. Many philosophers have thought a temporal analysis of the notion of something coming into existence from nothing (whether by God's will or by its own ethical requiredness) will undermine such assertions. The trouble with this approach is that it overrides modern views of time in physics.
Recall that in his 1905 paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity led to the abandonment of the Newtonian concept of the simultaneity of distant events; there is no absolute "now." McTaggart's 1908 paper on the unreality of time (McTaggart 1908) fuzzed this result by distinguishing what he called the A-series and the B-series in time. The A-series refers to what we subjectively perceive as time's passage, with its pastness, presentness and futurity, while the Bseries shows this to be an illusion: past, present and future are but different stretches of a static space-time manifold which are co-real and thus coexist without any privileged time dimension. McTaggart thought the B-series did allow for a distinction between earlier and later events, but as the physicist J. T. Frazer has said, this is a sleight of hand: without a hidden concept of a 'now' between them, no event can be said to be earlier or later than another (Frazer 1982) . Thus if the future is fixed in the space-time manifold just as the past is, not only can God not change the past: He cannot change the future either.
It follows from this that questions presupposing temporality, such as "When, exactly, did the universe come into being from nothing?" have no physical meaning, and should be left unasked. 'Before' and 'after', like 'earlier' and 'later' , are concepts without legitimate application to the space-time manifold that we take to comprise our physical universe.
2.
However this is not the whole story. If the universe came into being from nothing, there must have been a causal process involved. Of course when I say this I am not denying that there is no logical contradiction in the claim that whatever exists had no causal antecedent. But in fact I do not need to allow this, for both traditional theism and extreme axiarchism insist that there was a causal antecedent. Theism holds that the universe exists because God wanted it to; extreme axiarchism that it exists because it ought to exist. The difficulty with using terms like 'causal antecedent' is that we ineluctably think that a causal antecedent must pre-date its product. This is not necessarily so. If x causes y we can understand this in terms of x figuring in a different stretch of the space-time manifold than y, such that if x were not where it is, v would not be where it is. No temporal location need, then, be understood to be entailed in the causal relation between x and y.
We then come to the crucial question in this matter. If both theism and extreme axiarchism are logically possible solutions to Leibniz's question why there is something rather than nothing, what intelligibility can we give to either of them being true theories?
Let us begin with theism. Leibniz himself had an argument (see Alexander 1956 Alexander , 1976 ) that there could not be a Newtonian absolute space because if there were, God could have had no reason to create the physical universe where it is in space rather than elsewhere. Since God never acts without a sufficient reason for making things the way they are (so that if our knowledge were as great as His, we would see this is the best of all possible worlds) it follows that space is not absolute. Now as we saw earlier, if time is a fourth dimension of physical objects, we cannot raise meaningful questions about what was going on "before" or "earlier than" the emergence of the manifold of space-time: including God's act of creating. The theist can counter that God is traditionally conceived as non-physical, and so is exempt from restrictions imposed by modern physics. But this only highlights the difficulty of understanding how the space-time manifold came into being, for it implies that we could never, even in principle, write a bridging equation to describe God's causal role in bringing it about that the universe was created from nothing.
Does extreme axiarchism fare better? Well, it does not postulate a nonphysical entity having this causal role. But then it does not postulate any entity causing the world to come into being. Rather the physical universe causes itself to come into being, because a space-time manifold is a better state of affairs than there being nothing at all. Ethical requiredness, we are told, is the engine of creation; it bootstraps the world into being.
A strange and paradoxical doctrine indeed. But is this really an explanation of why there is a world?
3.
An explanation of anything should tell us what causes it, as in malaria being transmitted by mosquitoes, or a faulty gene being responsible for Huntington's Chorea. This is true, of course, of even the grandest features of the universe, such as entropy increase and the universe's expansion. But from this characteristic nature of explanation it does not follow that everything can be explained.
Consider the theory of the Big Bang. Although there is still room for healthy scepticism about it, few physical theories are so well attested to. The discovery of background radiation in the 1960s, the angle at which stars and whole galaxies are moving away from a single point, etc., speak strongly in its favour. Let us assume for the sake of argument that it is true. Now one may well want to ask what caused the Big Bang. Was it the consequence of a previous cycle of enormous compression of matter? Was it God's way of creating the physical universe out of nothing? Or did it hap-pen just because it was better that there be a space-time manifold instead of nothing?
Regarding the first alternative, we shall never know if that is the case. For given again that time is the fourth dimension of physical objects, the spacetime manifold itself came out of the singularity which provoked the Big Bang, and nothing about the present structure of matter in the universe allows us to infer its structure in earlier cycles (if in any). That does not mean-obviously-that there were no earlier cycles, just that we cannot know one way or the other. So the position that our universe derives from a permanent stock of matter is indeed defensible, even if not provable.
The second alternative, that the Big Bang was God's way of creating the world out of nothing, has as we have already seen the difficulty that we could never write a bridging equation which describes a non-physical entity causing the space-time manifold to come into being ex nihilo. It could be true, since there is no self-contradiction involved in asserting it, but science cannot tell us it is.
Finally, the notion that the physical universe came into being, again de novo, because it was better than there being nothing, is not obviously false: it is simply befuddling. Our idea of some state of affairs being "better than" another is powerfully parasitic upon human judgments. An architect deciding that twin towers would be better than a single one, for example, is straightforward and understandable. But extreme axiarchism in its purest form would have it that no intelligent being decides anything. If in fact a universe like ours is better than no universe at all, who or what decided this was the case? No one? No thing? But then how did this abstract "betterness" of there being something rather than nothing actually cause the universe to come into being? We need the notion of some kind of mechanism bringing this result, but extreme axiarchism supplies none.
4.
There are many philosophers like Leslie, and for that matter many scientific cosmologists, who agree that the universe could have been worse than it is. In particular, it could have been a lifeless universe/Indeed it has often been pointed out that, given the initial conditions of the Big Bang, it was extremely probable that our universe would be lifeless, and hence without intelligent observers. For this reason some have insisted that there must have been "fine-tuning" at work so that life and eventual observership could emerge: the Anthropic Principle.
However, critics like Jonathan Katz (1988 Katz ( , 1990 scoff at this reasoning, arguing that improbable outcomes never by themselves require special explanation. My chances of hitting a hole-in-one in golf are fairly remote: lifelong players usually manage but one; but we do not look for a special explanation when someone hits a hole-in-one. Nor does increasing improbability change the logic of our expectations. Suppose I charged the golf tee mounted on a polo pony, swung the mallet, and hit a hole-in-one. It would be an extraordinarily lucky shot, but still would not require a special explanation.
Furthermore, consider that just as the universe could indeed have been worse than it is (e.g., lifeless), it could also have been better than it is, much better.
Start with the observation that there is so little of the universe where life, hence intelligent observership, could plausibly arise. Geller (1991) estimates the volume of our universe at 10 31 cubic light years. That is 10,000 billion billion billion multiplied by the distance light travels in one year (6 trillion miles) cubed. And that is only the visible universe. If there is intelligent life other than on the Earth's surface, it must have evolved in planetary systems such as our own. Yet only about 5 percent of observable Sunlike stars show a reduction in angular momentum consistent with the gravitational effect of having a planetary system. If the universe began 10 to 20 billion years ago (let us say 15), and our Earth formed about 5 billion years ago, we know that within another 5 billion years our Sun and all similar stellar masses will become a red giant, hot enough to melt rocks on its planetary surfaces. After that it will become a white dwarf star, unable to warm anything. So while intelligent life arose in the last third of our universe's history, it may very well become extinct in the next fourth.
Could it not arise again in some further stage of the universe's history? Not if the universe is expanding at the rate reflected in Hubble's Law, which explains the increasing red-shift of galaxies the farther out one looks as recession velocities being proportional to their distances from each other. There not being enough matter in the universe to stop or even slow (by gravitational attraction) the expansion, our universe when newly dead will go on expanding forever and ever and ever, with no further prospect of life in it. Lucky indeed.
There are two other relevant considerations here. In the past decade it has been discovered that it is not true that most of the universe consists of empty space and interstellar dust. Whereas a solar system like our own shows decreasing velocity of orbiting planets, the farther away they are from the central gravitational mass (Mercury, the closest planet, orbits the Sun at 47 kilometers per second; while Pluto, one hundred times more distant, orbits at 4.7 kilometers per second), the same is not the case with huge stellar masses such as spiral galaxies. Stars at the very fringe of such galaxies orbit the central nucleus just as rapidly as stars near the center of the system. The only way to explain this is to suppose the adjacent presence of vast bodies of matter with huge gravitational attraction which are invisible because non-luminous: hence the name 'dark matter'. Could not dark matter be a further site of intelligent life? I fear not, because without light such matter has no heat, and life without heat could not evolve.
Finally, it has been very recently reported that evidence has emerged of there being planets around some neutron stars. Could their planetary surfaces harbour life? Not for more than a fraction of a second, because neutron stars give off massive radiation.
What would be a better universe than this one? Well, we have the very model before us in ancient literature. With the possible exception of a few Presocratics, the ancient Greeks like Socrates, Plato and Aristotle had no conception of Copernicanism and natural evolution. Their universe was cosily Ptolemaic, with the sun and the other eight planets going around a reliably stationary Earth. Every kind of thing existed for eternity and will continue to exist eternally, including rocks and trees and horses and human beings. Individual organisms aged and died, of course, but as a kind they persisted forever. It was the most stable imaginable world. I am not saying, obviously, that it was the best possible world, only that it was far better than the world 400 years of modern science has taught us is the actual universe. But that is enough, it seems to me, to undermine the claims of extreme axiarchists.
5.
If it is indeed Leibniz's famous question "Why is there something, rather than nothing?" which motivates extreme axiarchism, then we should look more closely at it.
Note first that the question has two parts, and that these are logically equivalent. If something exists, it cannot be the case that nothing exists; if nothing exists, it cannot be the case that something exists.
Leibniz seems to be asking why one of the two parts of his question is true, and the other false. Extreme axiarchists interpret him to be implying that it is better there be something rather than nothing, so this 'betterness' by itself explains the existence of a world. But there is nevertheless a great difference between the two parts of the question. For that there is something is confirmable. In fact it is confirmed every waking moment by experience. Even if one takes Descartes's Cogito argument seriously, the possible illusion of there being an external world is still something. But the claim that there could just as well be nothing, while logically possible, is not open to any possible confirmation. For in a world where there were nothing, there could be no observers to confirm that this is indeed the case. There is simply no point at which we could sit back and say, "Well, we were wrong. There is nothing."
Let me bring this out by historical disanalogy. Until the eighteenth century, Europeans did not know if the antipodal (literally the opposite of the bottom of their feet) regions of the globe contained land masses or consisted of nothing but empty seas. The voyage of Cook settled the matter once and for all. If there had been no such land masses, Cook and subsequent explorers from Europe would have encountered nothing but empty seas. But what would it be like to encounter, not just empty seas, but nothing? We cannot conceive it; it is an incoherent notion, and despite the abstract logical possibility that there be nothing, the second part of Leibniz's question is fundamentally dissimilar from the first. Does this matter? I think it does, because philosophers such as the extreme axiarchists talk as if the existence of the universe is some kind of discovery fraught with philosophical significance. But if the existence of nothing is not even in principle a discoverable state of affairs, then the existence of the world is not a contrasting discovery to be wondered at, and affords no basis for saying it requires an explanation in terms of ethical needs being creatively powerful.
